Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 32

Number 2

Article 7

2005

Policing the Police: The Role of the Courts and the Prosecution
Steven Zeidman

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Criminal Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Steven Zeidman, Policing the Police: The Role of the Courts and the Prosecution, 32 Fordham Urb. L.J.
315 (2005).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol32/iss2/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

Policing the Police: The Role of the Courts and the Prosecution
Cover Page Footnote
This Essay is an addendum to the collection, “A Conference on New York City’s Criminal Courts,” which
appeared in the Fordham Urban Law Journal, Vol. XXXI, No. 4. The Conference was held October 18, 2003
and was hosted by New York County Lawyers’ Association and the Fordham University School of Law’s
Louis Stein Center on Law and Ethics. ∗∗ Associate Professor, CUNY School of Law; J.D., 1981, Duke
University School of Law. For their encouragement, criticisms, and suggestions, I thank Mari Curbelo, Tom
Klein, and Robert Mandelbaum. I gratefully acknowledge as well the support of the Professional
Development Committee at CUNY School of Law.

This article is available in Fordham Urban Law Journal: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol32/iss2/7

ZIEDMANCHRISTENSEN

2/3/2011 10:01 PM

POLICING THE POLICE: THE ROLE OF THE
COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION∗
Steven Zeidman ∗∗
The New York City Criminal Courts Conference asked, “Are We
Given that those courts contended with
Achieving Justice.” 1
approximately 190,000 misdemeanor arrests in 2003, up from 130,000 in
1993, the question is increasingly relevant and important.2
This Essay focuses on how, and whether, the component parts of the
courtsjudges, court administrators, and prosecutorspromote justice by
actively and critically monitoring or overseeing the police.3 Police action
triggers the courts’ and institutional players’ opportunities to influence
justice. After an accused is deposited at the door of the court, all
components of the criminal justice system must carefully and rigorously
inspect the underlying police activity. It is time to ask whether anyone is
carrying out this vital task.
This is an especially timely inquiry. While reported crime in New York

∗

This Essay is an addendum to the collection, “A Conference on New York City’s Criminal
Courts,” which appeared in the Fordham Urban Law Journal, Vol. XXXI, No. 4. The
Conference was held October 18, 2003 and was hosted by New York County Lawyers’
Association and the Fordham University School of Law’s Louis Stein Center on Law and
Ethics.
∗∗
Associate Professor, CUNY School of Law; J.D., 1981, Duke University School of Law.
For their encouragement, criticisms, and suggestions, I thank Mari Curbelo, Tom Klein, and
Robert Mandelbaum. I gratefully acknowledge as well the support of the Professional
Development Committee at CUNY School of Law.
1. See generally Martha Rayner, Conference Report: New York City’s Criminal
Courts: Are We Achieving Justice?, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1023 (discussing the issues
raised at the Criminal Courts Conference).
2. THESE NUMBERS CAME FROM THE NYS DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES
WEBSITE. DCJS IS THE OVERSEEING BODY FOR CRIM JUSTICE IN NYS. I CHECKED THEIR
WEBSITE AND IT SEEMS AS IF IT HAS CHANGED. MISDEMEANOR INFO IS NO LONGER THERE. I
HAVE EMAILED THEM FOR THIS INFO AND EXPECT THEY WILL GET BACK TO ME QUICKLY VIA
EMAIL. IN FACT, JUST RECEIVED AN EMAIL FROM THEM CONFIRMING THOSE NUMBERS.

3. While defense attorneys are very much a piece of the puzzle, and are often a part of
the problem, a detailed examination of the defense lawyer’s role is beyond the scope of this
Essay.
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City is at its lowest level in decades,4 the number of misdemeanor arrests
has risen dramatically. 5 As a result, criminal justice policy is increasingly
revealed in the lower criminal court. 6
Two factors are responsible for the explosion in misdemeanor arrests.
First, during the term of Mayor David Dinkins, the “Safe Streets Safe City”
initiative resulted in a marked expansion in the size of the New York City
Police Department (“NYPD”). 7 More police officers created the potential
for more arrests. 8 Second, the influence of the “Broken Windows” theory
and the advent of “quality-of-life” policing under Mayor Rudolph Giuliani
unleashed that massive police force in such a way that encouraged
misdemeanor arrests for relatively minor misconduct.9

4. See, e.g., Michele McPhee, NYPD Crime-Crunching Patrol Hike is Back, DAILY
NEWS, Jan. 13, 2004, at 1 (“[W]e ended 2003 with the lowest crime rate in New York City
in four decades,” quoting New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg).
5. In 1983, there were 105,000 misdemeanor arrests in New York City, 85,000 less
than in 2003. SEE N.2 ABOVE – AWAITING THIS INFO FROM DCJS VIA EMAIL. IN FACT, JUST
RECEIVED AN EMAIL FROM THEM CONFIRMING THOSE NUMBERS.
6. In 1989, fifty percent of all New York City arrests were felonies. See Freda F.
Solomon, N.Y. City Criminal Justice Agency, Inc, The Impact of Quality-of-Life Policing,
Research Brief No. 3, Aug. 2003, [hereinafter CJA Research Brief], available at
http://cjareports.org/reports/brief2.pdf. In 1998, that number dropped to one-third. Id.
7. In 1991, the New York City Council and the state legislature approved the “Safe
Streets, Safe City” program. 1991 N.Y. LAWS ch. 6 (McKinney 1991). The centerpiece of
“Safe Streets, Safe City” was the addition of several thousand police officers. See Steven L.
Myers, Mayor Says Crime Data Affirm Strategies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1995, at 26 (stating
that the program “raised taxes specifically to pay for the hiring of 6000 more police
officers”).
8. Shortly after “Safe Streets, Safe City” was enacted, the Chief Administrator of the
New York State Courts, Matthew T. Crosson, predicted an increase in court caseloads. See
Gary Spencer, Legislators Rule Out More Funds for Judiciary, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 6, 1991, at 1;
see also John J. Donohue, Understanding the Time Path of Crime, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1423, 1432 (1998) (discussing the impact of the increase in the number of
police officers on the drop in crime).
9. See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social
Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order—
Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 292 (1998) (explaining how
New York City’s quality-of-life policing, an order maintenance strategy that focused on
minor misdemeanor offenses, was premised on the “Broken Windows” theory that “minor
physical and social disorder, if left unattended in a neighborhood, causes serious crime”);
George L. Kelling & William J. Bratton, Declining Crime Rates: Insiders’ Views of the New
York City Story, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1217, 1218-19 (1998) (the “Broken
Windows” theory “argued that, just as a broken window left untended was a sign that
nobody cares and leads to more and severe property damage, so disorderly conditions and
behaviors left untended send a signal that nobody cares and results in citizen fear of crime,
serious crime, and the ‘downward spiral of urban decay’” (quoting WESLEY SKOGAN,
DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF URBAN DECAY IN AMERICAN
NEIGHBORHOODS 84 (1990))); Jeffrey Rosen, Excessive Force, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 10,
2000, at 24 (“Once the police began thinking of low-level public disorder not as a problem
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The spike in misdemeanor arrests, especially for low-level offenses, is
not the only warning sign that such cases demand careful examination. The
proliferation of DNA exonerations of previously convicted individuals
provides incontrovertible proof that many defendants are actually innocent
and/or wrongly convicted. 10 The disparate impact of the present policing
on people of color has also been well documented. In 1999, the shooting of
Amadou Diallo by four police officers focused attention on the behavior of
the NYPD’s Street Crimes Unit (“SCU”). 11 SCU was primarily concerned
with finding illegal handguns. In 1998, the year before the Diallo shooting,
SCU reported stopping and frisking 27,061 people, of whom only 4647
were arrested. Put another way, nearly 22,000 people were mistakenly
searched. 12 After an exhaustive examination of the NYPD’s “stop and
frisk” 13 practices, the New York State Attorney General reported that
blacks and Latinos disproportionately bore the brunt of this aggressive
policing. 14 The New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board

to be addressed but as an opportunity to investigate more serious crime, the incentive to
arrest citizens for relatively minor offenses dramatically increased.”); James Q. Wilson &
George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar., 1982.
10. See, e.g., JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE 262-67 (2000); Alan Berlow, The
wrong man, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov., 1999; Donald A. Dripps, Miscarriages of Justice
and the Constitution, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 635 (1999); Richard A. Rosen, Innocence &
Death, 82 N.C. L. REV. 61, 65-78 (2003); Adam Liptak & Ralph Blumenthal, New Doubt
Cast on Crime Testing in Houston Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2004, at A19 (DNA
exoneration of man convicted of rape called into question the scientific evidence used to
convict thousands). For a discussion of the distinction between actual innocence and
convictions obtained due to significant legal error see Daniel Givelber, Meaningless
Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1317, 1346 (1997).
11. See Weekend of Progress in New York City, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1999, at A20.
12. Michael Cooper, Raids and Complaints Rise as City Draws on Drug Tips, N.Y.
TIMES, May 26, 1998, at A1.
13. “Stop and frisk” refers to the practice condoned by the United States Supreme Court
in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). According to Terry, a police officer may stop someone
if he reasonably suspects the person has committed or is about to commit a crime. Id. at 23.
The officer can frisk or “pat down” the person if he reasonably suspects he is in danger of
physical injury. Id. at 24.
14. Office of New York State Attorney General Elliot Spitzer, The New York City
Police Department’s “Stop & Frisk” Practices: A Report to the People of the State of New
York from the Office of the Attorney General, Dec. 1, 1999, at pt. 1, available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/reports/stop_frisk/stop_frisk.html. A draft report of the
United States Commission on Civil Rights found that racial profiling accounted for much of
the NYPD stop and frisk practices. See, e.g., Kevin Flynn, Rights Panel Scolds Police on
Race Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2000, at B1 (citing data from 1998 that showed that while
blacks make up nine percent of the Staten Island population, fifty-one percent of those
stopped and searched were black); see Jim Yardley, The Diallo Shooting: The Community In
Two Minority Neighborhoods, Residents See a Pattern of Hostile Street Searches, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 29, 1999, at B3 (“The police consider the stop-and-frisk an essential tool in
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(“CCRB”) examined NYPD “stop and frisk” activity by reviewing
complaints filed by people who had been stopped on the street and frisked
by a police officer. 15 The CCRB found that “African-Americans were
over-represented in this sample of street-stop complaints, while whites
were underrepresented.” 16
In January 2000, the NYPD implemented a narcotics enforcement
initiative called “Operation Condor.” 17 Two months later, Patrick
Dorismond was approached by an undercover Condor officer who asked
him where he could buy marijuana. 18 Somehow, after Mr. Dorismond
“reacted angrily,” he was shot and killed. In much the same way that the
killing of Amadou Diallo prompted an inquiry into the policy and behavior
of the SCU, the killing of Patrick Dorismond led to questions concerning
Operation Condor. 19 It soon became apparent that “75 percent of the
arrests under [Condor] have been for misdemeanors or even lesser offenses,
known as violations.” 20 The focus on relatively minor crimes and
violations, and the concomitant disproportionate impact on people of color,
in many ways characterize the NYPD’s criminal justice policy of the past
decade. 21 In fact, one of the architects of the “Broken Windows” theory,

reducing crime, arresting suspects and seizing illegal guns, but many residents in minority
neighborhoods say it has become an indiscriminate method of harassment.”). More
recently, an examination of data from January through June 2003 revealed that almost
eighty-three percent of those stopped and frisked were black or Latino. Alice McQuillan,
Say Blacks Targeted for Frisking, DAILY NEWS, June 18, 2003, at 6 (recognizing the depth
of the problem of race-based searches and seizures, the United States Department of Justice
issued Guidance Regarding the Use of Race by Federal Law Enforcement Agencies); see
also U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Guidance Regarding the Use of Race by
Federal
Law
Enforcement
Agencies,
June
2003,
available
at
http://pub.bna.com/cl/RacialProfiling.pdf.
15. Civilian Complaint Review Bd., Street Stop Encounter Report: An Analysis of
CCRB Complaints Resulting From the New York Police Department’s “Stop & Frisk”
Practices, June 2001, available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/pdf/stop.pdf.
16. Id.
17. Tina Kelley, Police Shooting Victim is Remembered and Mourned in Tears and
Song, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2000, at B4.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Kevin Flynn, Shooting Raises Scrutiny of Police Antidrug Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
25, 2000, at A1.
21. See, e.g., Harcourt, supra note 9, at 299 (“[A] law enforcement strategy that
emphasizes misdemeanor arrests has a disproportionate effect on minorities . . . .”); Joe
Davidson, Is Zero Tolerance a Solution or a Problem?, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 2004, at B1
(“The fatal NYPD shootings of Amadou Diallo and Patrick Dorismond . . . went hand-inhand with a war on crime that seemed to legitimize police abuse and racism.”); William K.
Rashbaum, Falling Crime in New York Defies Trend, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2002, at B1
(noting that almost one million people were arrested for minor violations in the preceding
eight years, and citing Professor Michael Jacobson of John Jay College of Criminal Justice
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James Q. Wilson, observed presciently, and frighteningly, that the
overwhelming desire to reduce crime might mean that “[y]oung black and
Hispanic men will probably be stopped more often than older white Anglo
males or women of any race.” 22
The motivations for, and consequences of, the creation and
implementation of these police strategies have been the subject of much
analysis and debate. Yet, what happens to those arrested pursuant to these
strategies has been glaringly bereft of critical review. What happens with
these cases inside the walls of the criminal courts is a question that remains
unanswered.
Over twenty years ago, the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York issued a report bemoaning the lack of trials in the New York City
Criminal Court.23 The report noted that only one-half of one percent of all
misdemeanor cases went to trial in the preceding year. 24 By all accounts,
the situation is even more direthere are tens of thousands more
misdemeanor cases, yet the trial rate is actually plummeting. 25 In addition
to the dearth of jury verdicts, there are also very few determinations of the
constitutionality of the police officers’ probable cause to stop, search, and
arrest. The court does not even appear to keep records of the number of
suppression hearings held, let alone the outcomes of those hearings. 26 The
regarding the “fraying effect” such zero tolerance approaches have on relationships between
police and minority citizens).
22. James Q. Wilson, Just Take Away Their Guns, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1994, at 47.
For Wilson, that was a fair price to pay in order to try and remove illegal guns from the
street. Id. A recent study by the New York Criminal Justice Agency revealed yet another
by-product of ramped up quality-of-life policingan increase in the arrests of older, chronic
offenders with myriad social problems, and a similar upsurge with respect to minority
youths, with no adult convictions, arrested for low-level drug offenses. CJA Research Brief,
supra note 6.
23. Criminal Courts Comm. of the Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Saving the
Criminal Court: A Report on the Caseload Crisis and Absence of Trial Capacity in the
Criminal Court of the City of New York 1983, at 18 [hereinafter Caseload Crisis].
24. Id. at 3. The report added bluntly: “If you tell people that several months went by
recently in Brooklyn Criminal Court without a single person being tried for anything they
will tell you, quite correctly, that you are talking about something which is not a court.” Id.
at 19 (emphasis in original).
25. State of N.Y., Div. of Criminal Justice Servs., Bureau of Justice Research and
Innovation, Misdemeanor Arrests New York City (on file with author). In fact, the New
York City misdemeanor trial rate in 2003 was less than one third of one percent. See id.
The lack of trials appears to be a widespread phenomenon. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The
Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts,
1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 459-84 (2004); Gina Holland, As Plea Deals Mount, Jury
Trials Diminish, SUNDAY REPUBLICAN, Aug. 8, 2004, at A3.
26. Telephone interviews with Alan J. Murphy, Chief Clerk, Manhattan Supreme Court,
Criminal Branch (DATE), and Chester Mount, Director of Research and Technology, New
York State Unified Court System, Office of Court Administration (DATE) [hereinafter
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result is virtually unfettered, unchecked police activity and discretion.
Once an officer makes an arrest, it is for all intents and purposes insulated
from any meaningful challenge or review.27
The free reign given to the police is even more troubling when
considered in light of the well-documented history of police misconduct
and corruption in New York City. In 1992, then New York City Mayor
David N. Dinkins assembled the Mollen Commission in response to
numerous and spreading allegations of drug dealing and corruption in
several police precincts. 28 The Commission’s charge was “to investigate
the nature and extent of corruption in the Department; to evaluate the
Department’s procedures for preventing and detecting corruption; and to
recommend changes and improvements in those procedures.”29 The
creation of a Commission to investigate the NYPD has become something
of a ritual in New York City. One of the members of the Mollen
Commission wrote about the “apparent twenty-year cycles of police
corruption scandals.” 30 The Commission itself observed that “[f]or the past
century, police corruption scandals in New York City have run in a regular
twenty-year cycle of scandal, reform, backslide, and fresh scandal.” 31
Indeed, the recent arrest and indictment of an NYPD detective and his

Telephone Interviews].
27. In addition, the accused can not realistically turn to the appellate courts for redress.
As a study of the New York Court of Appeals concluded, “Criminal defendants have little
hope of being heard by the Court on the merits of their claim, and those chosen few who do
get heard lose their cases in overwhelming numbers.” Norman A. Olch, Soft on Crime? Not
the New York Court of Appeals, N.Y.L.J., May 6, 1996, at 1; see John Caher, Court Grants
Record Low Criminal Appeals; Convictions Affirmed in 1999 Reach 76 Percent, N.Y.L.J.,
May 16, 2000, at 1 (“[T]he odds of a criminal convict getting his or her case before the
Court of Appeals are low and declining, while the chances of getting before the Court and
prevailing are reed-slim.”); Gary Spencer, Report Shows Court of Appeals Sheds Caseload,
with 198 Decisions in 1998, N.Y.L.J., June 2, 1999, at 1 (discussing the Court’s “continuing
reluctance in criminal cases to grant defendants leave to appeal”). The reversal rate in
criminal appeals is also plummeting in the intermediate appellate courts. See, e.g., John
Caher et al., Appellate Panels See Their Influence Rise; Tribunals Take on Role of Court of
Last Resort, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 23, 2001, at 1.
28. See, e.g., James C. McKinley, Jr., Dinkins Names Police Corruption Panel and
Urges Civilian Police Review, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1992, at A1 (reporting on Dinkins’s
appointment of a five member anti-corruption panel, headed by former Deputy Mayor for
Public Safety, Milton Mollen).
29. Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and the Anti-Corruption
Procedures of the Police Dep’t, City of New York, Commission Report 1994, at 11
[hereinafter Mollen Report], available at http://www.parc.info/reports/pdf/mollenreport.pdf.
30. J. Harold Baer, Jr., Symposium Speeches: The Mollen Commission and Beyond, 40
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 5, 5 (1995).
31. Mollen Report, supra note 29, at 148 (documenting 100 years of NYPD corruption
scandals); see also Clifford Krauss, Corruption in Uniform: The Long View; Bad Apple
Shake-Ups: A 20-Year Police Cycle, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1994, at B2.
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retired partner has all the hallmarks of the behavior that precipitated the
assembling of the Mollen Commission and other similar commissions.32
As one considers the myriad reasons why police misconduct so regularly
reoccurs, it is necessary to consider the typical responses to it. As the story
of corruption begins to unfold, the airwaves become replete with
prosecutors vowing full and thorough investigations and promising to bring
the full force of the law to bear.33 In the scandal’s wake comes the usual
hand-wringing and calls for revamping the Police Department and creating
independent police review boards. 34 Inevitably, the ensuing wrangling
between those who favor and those who oppose such oversight deflects
attention from the underlying issuehow best to police police
corruption. 35 Surely there are a multitude of reasons why the problem
persists, but it is time to look critically at the responses of the legal
system’s institutional playersparticularly, the courts and the prosecutors.
My focus is on a particular type of corruptionwhat the Mollen
Commission termed “falsifications.” 36 The Mollen Commission divided
this type of corruption into three categories: “testimonial perjury, as when
an officer testifies falsely under oath . . . ; documentary perjury, as when an
officer swears falsely under oath in an affidavit or criminal complaint; and
falsification of police records, as when an officer falsifies the facts and
circumstances of an arrest in police reports.” 37 Not only do these
“falsifications” directly impact the courts, but, according to the
Commission, they are “probably the most common form of police

32. See, e.g., William K. Rashbaum, A Widening Inquiry Focuses on Officers Tied to
Drug Money, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2004, at A1 (referring to the investigation as “the
biggest police corruption case in a decade”). The prevalence of widespread and entrenched
police corruption is by no means limited to New York City. See, e.g., Charles Rappleye,
Another Rupture in the LAPD’s Thin Blue Line, NEWSDAY, Oct. 10, 1999, at B4. The
corruption uncovered a few years ago in the Los Angeles Police Department rivals what
occurred in New York. Id. A police officer was arrested for stealing cocaine from an
evidence locker, and in exchange for leniency he revealed rampant misconduct in the
Department’s Rampart Division. Id. One result was the formation of the Los Angeles
Police Commission. Id. Coincidentally, Los Angeles had convened another police
commission, the Christopher Commission, just a few years earlier in the aftermath of the
brutal beating of Rodney King. See Joe Domanick, Law Enforcement; Civilian Control of
LAPD Is Elusive Despite Reforms, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1999, at M1.
33. See, e.g., Break the Police Corruption Cycle, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1994, at A26
(“The city needs an outside force, whether an independent special prosecutor or the
investigatory commission recommended by M. Mollen to take over in the fight against
corruption.”).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Mollen Report, supra note 29, at 36.
37. Id.
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corruption facing the criminal justice system.” 38 In fact, the Commission
found that the police practice of falsification was so prevalent in some
precincts that it generated its own term “testilying.” 39 These findings are
not revelations. The belief that police falsification is ubiquitous is widely
held. 40
What, then, have been the responses to this sweeping indictment? How
has the judiciary responded to the revelation that some percentage of police
officers were testifying falsely in their courts, swearing falsely to criminal
complaints, and/or falsifying police reports?
Testimonial perjuryfalse testimony under oathrears its head
particularly in suppression hearings. 41 The Mollen Commission found that
corrupt officers “manufactured facts” to justify unlawful searches and
arrests. 42 According to the Commission, “a common tale was the person
dropped a bag . . . as the officers approached.” 43 This so-called “dropsy”
testimony, designed to overcome any constitutional objection to the police
activity, is not new. In People v. McMurty, 44 Criminal Court Judge Irving
Younger discussed the sudden emergence of “dropsy” testimony, and
observed that it was only after the Supreme Court applied the exclusionary
rule to the states in Mapp v. Ohio 45 that he heard police officers testify that
38. Id. A recent study found that perjury by police officers was among the leading
causes of wrongful convictions. See Adam Liptak, Study Suspects Thousands of False
Convictions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2004, at A15.
39. Mollen Report, supra note 29, at 36. Some have similarly referred to the police
practice of falsifying reports as “reportilying.” See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Testilying:
Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037, 1039 (1996).
40. See, e.g., Carol A. Chase, Policing the Criminal Justice System: Rampart: A Crying
Need to Restore Police Accountability, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 767, 769 (2001) (commenting
that “[i]t has long been apparent that police officers testify untruthfully to avoid detection of
their misconduct”); Morgan Cloud, The Dirty Little Secret, 43 EMORY L.J. 1311, 1312
(1994) (explaining that “[t]he empirical studies on the subject suggest that perjured
testimony is common, particularly in drug prosecutions”); Alan Dershowitz, Is Legal Ethics
Asking the Right Questions, 1 J. INST. STUD. LEG. ETHICS 15, 16 (1996) (“The Mollen
Commission, the Knapp Commission, every commission that has studied the problem of
police perjury, has in my view seriously understated the problem and yet has come to the
conclusion that police perjury is rampant.”); Jerome H. Skolnick, Deception by Police,
CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, 42 (Summer/Fall 1982) (arguing that police perjury is “systemic”).
41. The Mollen Commission noted that police falsification was most prevalent in cases
involving possessory offenses, especially narcotics and guns. Mollen Report, supra note 29,
at 36; see also Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The “Blue Wall of Silence” as Evidence of
Bias and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 233, 248
(1998); Slobogin, supra note 39, at 1043 (“[T]he most common venue for testilying is the
suppression hearing . . . .”).
42. Mollen Report, supra note 29, at 37.
43. Id.
44. 314 N.Y.S.2d 194 (Crim. Ct. 1970).
45. 367 U.S. 643 (1961); see also Lewis Katz, Mapp After Forty Years: Its Impact on
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defendants dropped drugs as the police approached. 46 The logic behind
“dropsy” testimony is simpleif the defendant dropped the evidence then
there is no search to complain of. One study of pre- and post-Mapp cases
raised similar issues of police perjury, and concluded that “police are lying
about the circumstances of such arrests so that the contraband . . . will be
admissible.” 47 Judge Younger urged over thirty years ago that “dropsy”
testimony “should be scrutinized with especial caution.” 48
So then, what happens at hearings when police officers espouse
“dropsy” testimony or manufacture other facts to justify illegal searches?49
Are lying police officers caught by judges presiding over suppression
hearings? Although there is no hard data, 50 the anecdotal evidence
indicates that police officers “testily” with relative impunity.
Searches reveal precious few cases where evidence was suppressed
based on testimonial perjury. Given the Mollen Commission’s finding that
it is part of the most common form of corruption facing the criminal justice
system, 51 and the recognition that police perjury is indeed a widespread
problem, 52 this is worrisome, to say the least. Ironically, rather than
subjecting police testimony to some form of heightened scrutiny, especially
regarding dropsy cases, it appears that courts imbue police testimony with
heightened credence. As the Mollen Commission concluded, “In short, the
tolerance the criminal justice system exhibits takes the form of a lesser
level of scrutiny when it comes to police officers’ testimony. Fewer
questions are asked; weaker explanations are accepted.” 53
Race in America, 52 CASE W. RES. 471, 482 (2001) (“The impact of Mapp was naturally
greatest in the African-American community where Fourth Amendment violations were the
most common. Whatever limited effect Mapp would have, it would be felt most where
police conduct was the least restrained.”).
46. McMurty, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 196.
47. Sarah Barlow, Patterns of Arrests for Misdemeanor Narcotics Possession:
Manhattan Police Practices 1960-62, 4 CRIM. L. BULL. 549, 549-50 (1968).
48. McMurty, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 197.
49. The Mollen Commission also noted many other “manufactured tales.” Mollen
Report, supra note 29, at 38 (“To conceal an unlawful search of an individual who officers
believe is carrying drugs or a gun, they will falsely assert that they saw a bulge in the
person’s pocket or saw drugs and money changing hands.”).
50. See Telephone Interviews, supra note 26.
51. Mollen Report, supra note 29, at 38.
52. See Skolnick, supra note 40, at 42 (explaining that police perjury is systemic).
53. Mollen Report, supra note 29, at 42. This finding is especially troubling in the
context of dropsy testimony. Not only did Judge Younger urge that such testimony be
viewed with a jaundiced eye, but less than one year later, in People v. Berrios, 270 N.E.2d
709 (N.Y. 1971), the District Attorney of Manhattan expressed his concern regarding police
perjury and “dropsy” cases. Remarkably, the District Attorney joined the defense in urging
the court to hold that in dropsy cases the prosecution should shoulder the ultimate burden of
proof to establish the reasonableness of the warrantless search. The District Attorney’s brief
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The language used in the few opinions where evidence was suppressed
based on apparent police falsification is also telling. The courts’ choice of
words seems to reflect deliberate efforts to avoid calling police officers
“liars.” 54 Typically, the opinion states that the officer’s testimony was
“tailored to nullify constitutional objection.” 55 Even in those cases where
the courts use harsher language, they steer clear from calling the officer a
liar or perjurer. 56
One might imagine, given the rarity with which police officers are
deemed incredible, that those select few officers would be subject to dire
consequences. The NYPD, however, has shown little interest in policing
falsifications. 57 While disappointing, to say the least, it is not unexpected.
Ever since there have been police departments, much has been written
about the unwillingness and inability of the police to police itself. 58 Trial
stated, “For the last ten years participants in the system of justicejudges, prosecutors,
defense attorneys and police officialshave privately and publicly expressed the belief that
in some substantial but indeterminable percentage of dropsy cases, the testimony . . . is
tailored to meet the requirements of search-and-seizure rulings.” Id. at 714 (Fuld, C.J.,
dissenting). The court, however, declined to switch the burden of proof. Id. at 713.
54. See, e.g., Cloud, supra note 40, at 1323-24 (“Judges simply do not like to call other
government officials liarsespecially those who appear regularly in court.”); David N.
Dorfman, Proving the Lie: Litigating Police Credibility, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 455, 470-71
(1999) (“[A] scathing opinion impugning the motives, honesty, or competency of police is
rarely found in trial court opinions.”).
55. See, e.g., People v. Garofalo, 353 N.Y.S.2d 500 (App. Div. 1974); People v. Aquiar,
No. 51140(U), Slip Op. (N.Y. Co. Ct. Feb. 13, 2003); People v. Brown, N.Y.L.J., July 22,
2002 (Bx. Sup. Ct.) (Globerman, J.); People v. Curanovic, N.Y.L.J., May 2, 2003 (Bx. Sup.
Ct).
56. See, e.g., People v. Cassidy, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 23, 1993 (Kings Sup. Ct.) (“The
frequency of these farcical stories about how the arrest is made, can only lead to the
conclusion that somewhere in the system, someone is telling young police officers what to
say, irrespective of what actually happened in the street.”); People v. Martinez, N.Y.L.J.,
Mar. 20, 1992 (Kings Sup. Ct.) (Meyerson, J.) (“The Court finds the testimony of the . . .
Police witnesses to be factually unclear and unreliable.”); People v. Acosta, N.Y.L.J., June
25, 1991 (Bx. Sup. Ct.) (referring to “obvious flaws in the officer’s testimony and its
inherent unbelievability,” and stating that “obvious attempts by police to circumvent our
basic fourth amendment freedoms . . . will not be tolerated”); People v. Akwa, 573 N.Y.S.2d
216, 217 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (“Based upon the glaring inconsistencies revealed in his testimony,
and upon the manifestly false explanations he manufactured to account for them, I find his
testimony unworthy of belief); People v. Fairley, N.Y.L.J., July 17, 1990 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.)
(“Particularly disturbing to this Court is the willingness of the enforcer of our laws to distort
the truth to justify his ends.”).
57. Mollen Report, supra note 29, at 41 (noting that “supervisors were rarely, if ever,
held accountable for the falsifications of their subordinates” and that there was not “a single,
self-initiated Internal Affairs Division investigation into patterns of police perjury”); Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 416 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting) (“[w]ith rare exceptions law enforcement agencies do not impose direct
sanctions on the individual officer” when evidence is suppressed).
58. See, e.g., Don’t Veto the Police Commission, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1994, at A18;
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judges, who observe the witness swear to tell the truth and then willingly,
brazenly, and publicly violate that oath, occupy another position entirely.
And, no matter how gently and carefully it is labeled, a finding of police
incredibility is another way of saying that the officer committed a
crimeperjury. 59 Contrast a case where evidence is suppressed because of
police perjury with one where evidence is suppressed because the officer,
while testifying truthfully, did not have the requisite quantum of
information to support his actions. While both result in “illegal” or
“unlawful” searches, the one predicated on perjury is “illegal” in the truest
sense of the word. Yet, judges by and large do not refer these cases to the
appropriate law enforcement authorities.
Are judges aware of the problem of police testimonial perjury? One
judge in New York City candidly admitted as much: “Few have not been
troubled by police testimony obviously tailored or patently false.” 60 One
commentator observed that the “regular participants in the criminal justice
system”judges includedall know that police officers commit perjury.61
Perhaps, while judges may acknowledge the existence of police perjury
generally, it is an altogether different proposition to discern and label it in a
particular case. This may be especially true when dealing with a
professional, experienced police officer witness.62
Yet, we are told that perjury exists, and so it must be discovered.
Instead of accepting police testimony as truthful, judges should be skeptical
and scrutinize the testimony in the way suggested by Judge Younger thirtyfive years ago. 63 They should listen carefully for catch phrases designed to
justify warrantless searches. 64 One judge has suggested that to overcome
police fabrications judges must also take a more active role in determining
the facts. 65 In that case, the judge ordered a crime scene visit to verify

Mark H. Moore & David M. Kennedy, N.Y.P.D. Clean, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1994, at A19;
Mr. Giuliani’s Police Ploy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1995, at 18; The Case for a Police Monitor,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2000, at 18.
59. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 210 (McKinney 2003).
60. People v. Diaz, 625 N.Y.S.2d 388, 397 (Bx. Sup. Ct. 1994).
61. Cloud, supra note 40, at 1311-12.
62. Id. at 1321-22 (noting that judges often accept perjury because it is difficult to
determine if a police officer is lying, particularly if he is an experienced witness).
63. See, e.g., Laurie L. Levenson, Unnerving the Judges: Judicial Responsibility for the
Rampart Scandal, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 787, 790 (2001) (“[J]udges unwittingly participate
in police perjury and misconduct by not critically examining police credibility . . . .”).
64. Mollen Report, supra note 29, at 37-38. The Mollen Report refers to police
fabricating probable cause by relying on legal language such as “hot pursuit” or “plain
view.” Id.
65. Diaz, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 390.
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independently the testimony’s credibility and accuracy. 66 Perhaps above
all, judges must be willing to find and state that a police officer has
committed perjury.
What, then, about those exceptional cases where judges do find the
police witness to be incredible? Given how rare it is for a judge to make
such a finding, one imagines that the offending officer’s testimony must
have been beyond the pale. Surely in those cases the judges refer the
perjurer to the appropriate NYPD and prosecutorial authorities.
Apparently, even in cases finding testimonial falsification, judges are loath
to report the “testilier” to the appropriate authorities.67
No doubt, part of the judicial reluctance is grounded in concerns of
certaintyhow sure should a judge be before referring a police officer for
investigation? The standards that govern prosecutors are illuminating.
Prosecutors are advised to file charges if there is probable cause to believe
One scholar suggests that
the defendant committed the crime. 68
prosecutors actually need only a “fair possibility” of guilt in order to
commence a prosecution.69 It stretches credulity to imagine that a judge
finding that an officer had tailored his testimony to overcome constitutional
requirements would not concomitantly have probable cause, or a fair
possibility, to believe the officer committed perjury. Judges must strive to

66. Id. at 393.
67. See, e.g., Levenson, supra note 63, at 794.
[T]here has been a failure by judges who have witnessed police perjury to take
meaningful action to prevent such misconduct in the future. A judge’s standard
course of action when an officer has lied is to dismiss the case or grant a motion to
suppress, and ask the prosecutors to report the misconduct to appropriate police
internal affairs authorities. There is no follow-up by the court, no judicial
reporting of the misconduct, no contempt orders, and no tracking of the problem
officers.
Id. A judge in California recently spelled out her inner conflict as she declined to go after
officers she suspected of having testified falsely in her courtroom. Katherine Mader,
Conundrum: How Should a Judge Act if She Suspects Two Police Officers Have Testified
Falsely, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2004, at 10.
68. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (2002).
69. Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1573, 1588
(2003). Green argues that Model Rule 3.8(a), dealing with the decision whether to
prosecute, is a standard “that is both too low and incomplete.” Id. In another article, Green
observed that “most commentators would agree that a prosecutor should not bring charges
unless she has some degree of confidence that the person charged is in fact guiltyalthough
there is disagreement about how much confidence is needed.” Bruce A. Green & Fred C.
Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 837, 843 n.25 (2004). Several
commentators have argued that prosecutors should be personally convinced of the
defendant’s guilt. See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth, 14 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 309, 339-42 (2001); John Kaplan, The Prosecutorial DiscretionA
Comment, 60 NW. U. L. REV. 174, 178 (1965-66).
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uncover perjury, and, when they do root it out, they must not let their
findings go unnoticed.
For all the varieties of police falsification, perhaps the most revealing
was the practice of “trading collars.” 70 Not content to exaggerate or lie
about what they did or did not do during the arrest, in this recurring
scenario police officers testified about events that occurred when they were
not even present:
In one precinct we investigated, a cooperating officer told us of a regular
pattern of “trading collars.” The purpose of this practice was to
accumulate overtime pay for the officers involved. In the scheme, the
police officer who actually arrested the defendant would pass off the
arrest to a colleague who was not involved or even present at the time of
the arrest. Trading collars was done to maximize the overtime pay
because the regular day off of the officer taking the arrest coincided with
the likeliest date for a required court appearance. The officer who took
the arrest would get all the details from the actual arresting officer, fill out
the arrest papers, interview with the District Attorney, and, if necessary,
testify to the circumstances of the arrest. 71

The critical question is what has the judiciary done post-Mollen
Commission to make sure it is able to ferret out perjury, and that it never
again becomes a complicit or unwitting participant in police falsifications.
How have judges responded to the embarrassing and terrifying revelation
that they were being duped in many cases? What has the Criminal Court
done in response to the clarion call for judicial oversight of the Police
Department? Can it be that all the judiciary is doing is relying on the
NYPD to better police itself? How many more scandals must there be
before the court changes the way it does business? The problem persists
because police officers have learned since time immemorial that they can
get away with it. It is time for the judiciary to look itself in the mirror and
acknowledge its role, however unintentional, in the police falsifications
unearthed by the Mollen Commission. 72 “Testiliers” correctly learned that
70. Mollen Report, supra note 29, at 39.
71. Id. at 39-40; see also Joe Sexton, Types of Perjury Common Among Police Officers
Are Detailed, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1994, at 27.
They are called “turnover arrests.” A police officer arrests a suspect but has plans
for the weekend and doesn’t want to spend the next day in court. So he asks his
partner not only to take credit for the arrest, but to take the witness stand in front
of the grand jury as well. As mundane as the motivation is, the resulting
testimony nevertheless amounts to perjury.
72. See Dershowitz, supra note 40, at 23.
The time has come for the courts to understand that they are a serious part of the
problem . . . . Judges at every level of every court. Judges who are the ones who
say they believe [the perjury]. The appellate judges who say we believe the
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their lies would be credited, or, even if not, that they would not suffer any
ill consequences. 73
There are other ways the judiciary can more effectively combat police
falsifications. It is well past time for the judiciary to reconsider the use of
the guilty plea, especially the guilty plea early in the proceedings, as the
engine that drives the Criminal Court. For too long, police corruption has
been buried under an avalanche of guilty pleas:
A large part of the problem is that once officers falsify the basis for an
arrest, search, or other action in a Department recordsuch as an arrest
report, complaint report, search warrant application, or evidence
voucherto avoid Departmental or criminal charges, they must stick to
their story even under oath when swearing to a criminal complaint or
giving testimony before a trial jury. But officers know that the operation
of the criminal justice system itself usually protects them from having to
commit testimonial perjury before a grand jury or at trial. The vast
majority of charges for narcotics or weapons possession crimes result in
pleas without the necessity of grand jury or trial testimony, thus obviating
officers’ concerns about the risk of detection and possible exposure to
criminal charges of perjury. 74

judges who said they believe it.
Id.; Dorfman, supra note 54, at 465 (“One of the strongest reasons that police lie in court is
the simple fact that judges allow them to get away with it.”); Levenson, supra note 63, at
788 (“[J]udges must accept some responsibility for the Rampart scandal . . . .”).
73. Chase, supra note 40, at 769 (“In all but the most egregious of cases . . . a police
officer faces no direct consequences of his or her violation.”); see Mollen Report, supra note
29, at 36 (“The challenge we face in combating police falsifications, is not only to prevent
the underlying wrongdoing that spawns police falsifications but to eliminate the tolerance
the Department and the criminal justice system exhibit about police who fail to tell the
truth.”); Levenson, supra note 63, at 791 (“One can only assume that the officers who lied
in the Rampart scandal felt emboldened to do so because they knew they could get away
with it.”); Slobogin, supra note 39, at 1045 (arguing that police perjury persists because
“police think they can get away with it”).
74. Mollen Report, supra note 29, at 36-37.
Trials put official behavior on public display; professionalism is reinforced and
sloppy, dishonest or abusive conduct is exposed for correction. When it is
extremely unlikely that a hearing or trial will ever examine the propriety of their
conduct or the truthfulness of what they say, police officers inevitably become
less concerned with how they make their arrests, conduct searches and treat
defendants.
Caseload Crisis, supra note 23, at 15; see also Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System
of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2146 (1998) (“fully-adjudicated cases may
be too rare to serve as a meaningful check on the executive authorities,” and there are “too
few misdemeanor trials to serve as an effective appeals process to regulate prosecutorial
decisions”). The lack of trials is endemic to criminal justice systems. See, e.g., Stephanos
Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2466 n.9
(2004) (noting that in 2000, about ninety-five percent of felony convictions in state courts
were the result of guilty pleas).
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The high volume of pleas at arraignments 75 is especially alarming given
that the defense lawyer has just met the client and has not yet investigated
and researched the facts and law of the case. 76 The threat of pretrial
detention causes many defendants to strike a Faustian bargainrather than
contest the charges, they plead guilty in exchange for their freedom. In the
words of one authority on the Criminal Court, “Judges may, especially in
misdemeanor cases, set bail at a level they expect is too great for the
defendant to make, and then indicate to the defendant that were he to plead
guilty the sentence would be time served and he’d be released from
custody.” 77
To best perform their justice-seeking mission, judges should encourage
meaningful examinations of the facts and circumstances of the arrest.
Presently, it is commonplace for judges to revoke plea offers if the
defendant insists on a pretrial suppression hearing. It is also typically the
case that a conviction after trial results in a sentence substantially higher
than that attached to a guilty plea offer.78 The predictable result is a slew
of guilty pleas that serve to insulate police practice from scrutiny.
It may well be the case that transformation of the judicial reliance on
guilty pleas, especially at the accused’s initial court appearance, is also
mandated by judicial ethics codes. According to the American Bar

75. In July-December 2003, nearly half of all cases arraigned in New York City
Criminal Court were disposed of at arraignment. Guilty pleas accounted for almost twothirds of those dispositions. N.Y. City Criminal Justice Agency, Inc., Annual Report 2003,
at 16.
76. Pleas at arraignments fly directly in the face of the lawyer’s constitutional and
ethical duty to investigate. The American Bar Association Standards that govern defense
attorneys provide that defense counsel should “conduct a prompt investigation of the
circumstances of the case and explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of
the case. . .,” and “[u]nder no circumstances should defense counsel recommend to a
defendant acceptance of a plea unless a full investigation . . . has been completed.” ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION §§ 44.1, 4-6.1 (1980).
77. Richard Klein, Due Process Denied: Judicial Coercion in the Plea Bargaining
Process, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1349, 1382 (2004); see also Bibas, supra note 74, at 2491-93.
78. See, e.g., MALCOLM C. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT—HANDLING
CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 197 (1979); Levenson, supra note 63, at 792.
[W]ittingly or not, judges provide the additional hammer prosecutors and police
officers need to coerce defendants to forego trial and their right to challenge the
evidence. When judges routinely impose maximum sentences on those who go to
trial, and much more lenient sentences on those who do not, the message to
defendants is that there is a devastating cost to exercise their Sixth Amendment
right to a fair trial.
Id.; Steven Zeidman, To Plead or Not to Plead: Effective Assistance and Client-Centered
Counseling, 39 B.C. L. REV. 841, 886 n.285 (1998).
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Association Standards, judges are charged with “safeguarding the rights of
the accused.” 79 Surely, the accused’s right to a jury trial and to be free
from unlawful searches and seizures falls within the ambit of that
admonition. 80 Judges must actively “safeguard” the defendant’s rights. In
other contexts, commentators have called on the judiciary to play a more
active role to ensure that all litigants have access to justice.81 The notion of
judges as active participants is not far-fetched. The advent of problemsolving courts has spawned a new way of thinking about a judge’s role in
court proceedings. Problem-solving judges are asked to take on a more
participatory, active role in the resolution of the cases in their courts.82
In a related context, it is not uncommon these days for judges to make
themselves heard regarding their critical views about existing laws.83
Some have even suggested that organizations of judges should lobby
against unfair laws, or, at a minimum, take a public stance.84
In a similar vein, judges should recognize and acknowledge the
importance of suppression hearings when considering a defense motion to
suppress evidence.
If those hearings are the place where police
falsification is most likely to rear its head, 85 then it behooves the court to
hold more, not fewer, suppression hearings. One would think that the
publicized recognition about the disproportionate impact of present
policing policies on people of color, and the increasing acknowledgement
that many are wrongly convicted, would compel the courts to examine the
basis for the search and seizure in every case. Yet, in actuality the trend
seems to be toward narrow and overly strict interpretations of case law as a

79. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SPECIAL
FUNCTIONS OF THE TRIAL JUDGE § 6-1.1 (3d ed. 2000).
80. Klein, supra note 77, at 1372.
81. See, e.g., Russell G. Pearce, Redressing Inequality in the Market for Justice: Why
Access to Lawyers Will Never Solve the Problem and Why Rethinking the Role of Judges
Will Help, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 969 (2004) (urging replacing “the paradigm of judge as
passive umpire with the paradigm of judge as active umpire”).
82. See, e.g., James L. Nolan, Jr., Redefining Criminal Courts: Problem-Solving and the
Meaning of Justice, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1541, 1543 (2003). For more regarding problemsolving courts see infra notes 99-117 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., Deborah Pines, Ten Years Later, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Go Down
Easier; Seen as Allowing Judges More Flexibility than Anticipated, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 3, 1997,
at 1 (“Some of the loudest critics in the early years of the federal sentencing guidelines were
federal district judges.”). In fact, some judges have resigned from the bench in a public
display of their distaste for the federal sentencing guidelines. See Leonard Post, Irked By
Sentencing Law Two U.S. Judges Lash Out at “Feeney,” RECORDER, Feb. 13, 2004, at 3.
84. See, e.g., John Caher, Backer of Changes in Rockefeller Drug Law Says Judges
Should Get Off the Sidelines, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 7, 2004, at 1.
85. See generally Chin & Wells, supra note 41, 248-50 (noting the prevalence and
tolerance of police perjury in suppression hearings).
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means to deny defendants suppression hearings. 86
Once a hearing is commenced, it must be viewed as an opportunity to
discover the truth. Judges should refrain from sacrificing the truth seeking
function of the hearing at the altar of judicial expediency and economy. If
cross-examination 87 is indeed the best method to ascertain the truth, 88 then
courts should refrain from unduly limiting the scope and nature of the
cross. 89 Similarly, the court should demand that the prosecutor call as
witnesses the police officers most directly involved in the arrest.
Increasingly, prosecutors are using hearsay upon hearsay to make their
case. 90 This provides another layer of insulation for a corrupt police
officer. Finally, the court should be more willing to allow the defense to
call its own witnesses, including any of the police officers involved with
the arrest. 91 Undoubtedly, some of these changes might result in greater
demands on police time. The key question is whether the court should be
most concerned with causing the police officer some degree of
inconvenience, or with critically examining what occurred. The Mollen
86. See, e.g., People v. Mendoza, 624 N.E.2d 1017 (N.Y. 1993). The court in Mendoza
addressed the requirements of N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 710.60 [hereinafter N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW] regarding what the defense must allege in a suppression motion in order to
merit a hearing. The Court stated that the factual allegations should be evaluated by the face
of the pleadings, and assessed in conjunction with the context of the motion and the
defendant’s access to information. Mendoza, 624 N.E.2d at 1021. Commentators have
observed that trial courts are increasingly applying Mendoza to deny defense motions for
suppression hearings. See, e.g., Brooks Holland, Defendants in Possession Cases Face a
Dilemma in Pleading Standing, N.Y.L.J., June 30, 1999, at 1.
87. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
88. See, e.g., FRANCIS L. WELLMAN, THE ART OF CROSS-EXAMINATION (4th ed. 1948); J.
Alexander Tanford & Sarah Tanford, Better Trials Through Science: A Defense of
Psychologist-Lawyer Collaboration, 66 N.C. L. REV. 741, 765 (1988) (“[C]rossexamination is said to be an excellent vehicle for discovering and exposing the falsehoods of
mendacious witnesses.”).
89. For a discussion of the defendant’s right to fully cross-examine the prosecution’s
witnesses at a suppression hearing, see generally People v. Edwards, 741 N.E.2d 876 (N.Y.
2000), and People v. Williamson, 588 N.E.2d 68 (N.Y. 1991).
90. The prosecution has the burden of going forward with evidence that shows a
constitutional basis for the arrest. See People v. Parris, 632 N.E.2d 870, 872 (N.Y. 1994). A
police officer testifying at a suppression hearing can establish probable cause by personal
knowledge or by information provided by others. See People v. Washington, 663 N.E.2d
1253, 1254 (N.Y. 1996); Parris, 632 N.E.2d at 873. It is not always the case, however, that
hearsay will suffice. See, e.g., People v. Ketcham, 712 N.E.2d 1238, 1241-43 (N.Y. 1999);
People v. Gonzalez, 600 N.E.2d 238, 238-39 (N.Y. 1992).
91. See People v. Chipp, 552 N.E.2d 608, 614 (N.Y. 1990) (finding that the right of
compulsory process at a pretrial hearing regarding the admissibility of identification
testimony is within the court’s discretion); see also People v. Skinner, 632 N.Y.S.2d 283,
285 (App. Div. 1995);
People v. Acquaah, 562 N.Y.S.2d 62, 64 (App. Div. 1990) (“A defendant’s right to call a
witness at a suppression hearing is not absolute.”).
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Report and the New York City history of police scandals should answer
that question easily.
By turning their focus to the underlying actions of the police, the courts
will return to the lofty ideals of the exclusionary rule and the critical role of
the judiciary. In Weeks v. United States, the Court established the rule
excluding in a federal prosecution evidence obtained by federal agents in
violation of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. 92 Subsequently, in
Mapp v. Ohio, the Court extended the exclusionary rule to the states as a
matter of constitutional law so that evidence obtained in violation of the
Constitution was inadmissible in a criminal trial in state court.93 Over
time, the Court has made clear that the exclusionary rule’s “primary
purpose is to deter unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the
guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and
seizures.” 94 Put another way, “Its purpose is to deterto compel respect
for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available wayby
The logic is
removing the incentive to disregard it.” 95
straightforwardevidence must be suppressed in order to deter the police
from violating the Constitution. 96
If, on the other hand, evidence is virtually never suppressed, illegal
searches will thrive. No doubt the findings of the Mollen Commission and
92. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
93. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
94. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974); see also Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 235 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (explaining that one
justification for the exclusionary rule is its role in “exert[ing] general legal pressures to
secure obedience to the Fourth Amendment on the part of federal law-enforcing officers”);
Daniel S. Schneider, The Future of the Exclusionary Rule and the Development of State
Constitutional Law, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 377, 384 (1987) (arguing that the exclusionary rule
is designed to deter police misconduct).
95. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
96. See, e.g., Samuel Walker, The New Paradigm of Police Accountability: The U.S.
Justice Department “Pattern or Practice” Suits in Context, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 3,
17-18 (2003) (noting that court oversight of police conduct is limited by the number and
kind of issues considered by courts); see also Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181
(1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Only occasional and more flagrant abuses come to the attention of the courts, and
then only those where the search and seizure yields incriminating evidence and the
defendant is at least sufficiently compromised to be indicted. If the officers raid a
home, an office, or stop and search an automobile but find nothing incriminating,
this invasion of the personal liberty of the innocent too often finds no practical
redress. There may be, and I am convinced that there are, many unlawful searches
of homes and automobiles of innocent people which turn up nothing
incriminating, in which no arrest is made, about which the courts do nothing, and
about which we never hear. Courts can protect the innocent against such
invasions only indirectly and through the medium of excluding evidence obtained
against those who frequently are guilty.
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the New York State Attorney General support that conclusion. Perhaps
former Chief Justice Warren Burger put it best, “The rule has rested on a
theory that suppression of evidence in these cases was imperative to deter
law enforcement authorities from using improper methods to obtain
evidence.” 97 Burger went on to observe that law enforcement would be
deterred if the evidence is “suppressed often enough.” 98 Suffice it to say
that the Criminal Court has long since abandoned this critical role, and we
all pay the price with the outbreak of every police scandal and/or
publication of reports detailing stop and frisk abuses on our streets.
What do the courts as a whole now do differently? How have the courts
changed in the quality-of-life/zero tolerance policing, post-Mollen
Commission world? .In the past decade, so-called problem-solving courts
have begun to dot the judicial landscape.99 Drug treatment courts, domestic
violence courts, community courts and even commercial courts, have
evolved from interesting pilot projects to mainstream court
administration.100 Under the leadership of Chief Judge Judith Kaye, New
York has assumed the position as the state judiciary most committed to
reinventing the way its courts do business. 101 Problem-solving courts “use
the coercive authority of the courts to achieve more meaningful case
outcomes,” 102 and “broaden the focus of legal proceedings from factfinding and narrow legal issues to changing the future behavior of litigants
(and the future well-being of communities).” 103 Leading proponents of
problem-solving courts revel in the prospects of “full-scale reform of [the]

97. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 413 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 415 (emphasis added).
99. For a further discussion on problem-solving courts see generally Greg Berman &
John Feinblatt, Problem-Solving Courts: A Primer, 23 LAW & POL’Y 125 (2001); Judith
Kaye, Rethinking Traditional Approaches, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1491 (1999); and Bruce J.
Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Problem Solving Courts, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1055 (2003).
100. Even the Supreme Court is weighing in. In his speech at the American Bar
Association’s annual meeting, Justice Stephen G. Breyer urged the development of
problem-solving courts. See Molly McDonough, ABA Notes: Breyer on Supreme Civility,
NAT’L L.J., Aug. 20, 2001, at A15.
101. Judge Kaye’s efforts in this regard have received national attention and recognition.
She was awarded the National Center for State Courts’ 1999 William H. Rehnquist Award
for Judicial Excellence based on her “innovative, problem-solving approach to justice.” See
Today’s News Update, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 10, 1999, at 1. There are almost thirty problemsolving courts operating presently in New York City alone. See Rayner, supra note 1, at
1049 n.63.
102. John Feinblatt, et al., Institutionalizing Innovation: The New York Drug Court Story,
28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 277, 282 (2000).
103. Id.
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state court system.” 104 The State’s Chief Administrative Judge speaks of
“institutionalizing [the] problem-solving approach into the very fabric of
what we do in the courts on a daily basis.” 105
Court innovation is to be commended. Unquestionably, the age-old way
of doing business in the Criminal Court was not working on any measure,
and it is no small accomplishment to reform the culture of the courts.106
Still, the problem-solving court movement must be carefully scrutinized.
Although imbued with noble goals, it is imperative to ask whether these
courts actually encourage or discourage a probing, critical examination of
how the police came to bring the accused under the thumb of the criminal
justice system in the first place.
Coincidentally, or ironically, the advent of these courts coincides with
the massive influx of misdemeanor arrests. Just as misdemeanor cases
came to dominate the court calendars, problem-solving approaches began
to permeate judicial attitudes. As the net widened, and the police arrested
more peopleprimarily people of colorfor relatively minor
transgressions, the courts began to change their focus. We cannot, and
should not, uncouple the proliferation of problem-solving courts from the
underlying police activity that brought the accused into court.
Problem-solving courts seek to promote a mindset of cooperation among
all the institutional players. Defense lawyers are urged to shift from a
litigation-based, adversarial approach to a team-based problem-solving
ideal. 107 Typical of the descriptions of these courts are comments about the
Red Hook Community Justice Center in Brooklyn, New York: “The
prosecutor and defense lawyer are part of the same team, working on the
long-term best interests of individual defendants and the community.” 108
Proponents of problem-solving courts and its teamwork emphasis aver
that the adversarial system is not working. It is more accurate, however, to
note that the Criminal Court is not, and has never been, adversarial. Ever
since Gideon v. Wainwright 109 spawned the development of public

104. Feinblatt, supra note 102, at 279-80.
105. John Caher, $1.14 Billion Budget Proposed By Judiciary; 3.4% Increase Sought in
Court Spending, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 2, 1999, at 5 (quoting New York’s Chief Administrative
Judge Jonathan Lippman).
106. See, e.g., MALCOLM C. FEELEY, COURT REFORM ON TRIAL: WHY SIMPLE SOLUTIONS
FAIL (1983) (evaluating various means of court reform).
107. See, e.g., Judith S. Kaye, Lawyering for a New Age, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 5
(1998); Nolan, supra note 82, at 1543; see generally Drug Courts Program Office, Office of
Justice Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Defining Drug Courts: The Key Components, 1997,
available at http://www.ncjrs.org/html/bja/define/welcome.html.
108. Terry Carter, Red Hook Experiment, 90 A.B.A. J. 36, 39 (June 2004).
109. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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defender offices across the country, commentators have detailed the
widespread deficiencies of many indigent defense providers.110 Whether
due to staggering caseloads, institutional pressures, organizational
cooptation, or bureaucratic allegiances to other players in the court system,
the proclivities of indigent defense attorneys to plead out their clients are
well-documented. 111 Although the Criminal Court has been fraught with
problems, an overabundance of adversarialness is not one of them. As one
scholar observed, “the American system as it actually operates in most
cases looks much more like what common lawyers would describe as a
non-adversarial, administrative system of justice than like the adversarial
model they idealize.” 112 In this day and age, what we actually need to
develop is a true, full-scale adversarial system where hearings and trials are
the norm.
Other commentators believe that by abandoning even the semblance of
the adversarial system, and in so doing pushing aside concerns of probable
cause and culpability, problem-solving courts inappropriately fast forward
to sentencing. 113 Particularly troubling are those courts that encourage
defendants, implicitly or explicitly, to plead guilty early in the
proceedings. 114 The result is a system exactly the opposite of one that

110. See, e.g., ROBERT HERMANN ET AL., COUNSEL FOR THE POOR: CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN
URBAN AMERICA (1977); Michael McConville & Chester L. Mirsky, Criminal Defense of
the Poor in New York City, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 581 (1986-87).
111. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 84
YALE L.J. 1179, 1182 (1975); Abraham Blumberg, The Practice of Law as a Confidence
Game: Organizational Cooptation of a Profession, LAW & SOC’Y REV., June 1967, at 18;
Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the
Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 65675 (1986); David Sudnow, Normal Crimes: Sociological Features of the Penal Code in a
Public Defender Office, 12 SOC. PROBS. 255, 256, 258-59 (1965).
112. Lynch, supra note 74, at 2118.
113. See, e.g., Cait Clarke & James Neuhard, “From Day One”: Who’s in Control as
Problem Solving and Client-Centered Sentencing Take Center Stage?, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 11, 28 (2004) (“These specialized courts are essentially extended sentencing
courts designed to support ongoing relationships and monitoring of the offender by a judge
and professional service providers who work for the court.”); Jane M. Spinak, Why
Defenders Feel Defensive: The Defender’s Role in Problem-Solving Courts, 40 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1617, 1623 (2003) (“[T]here needs to be a more thorough analysis of when the
clients’ due process rights are appropriately incorporated into the problem-solving court
rather than assuming these rights get in the way of achieving good outcomes for clients.”).
114. See Clarke & Neuhard, supra note 113, at 30; Morris B. Hoffman, The Drug Court
Scandal, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1437, 1533 (2000) (“In their mad rush to dispose of cases, drug
courts are risking the due process rights of defendants and turning all of usjudges, staff,
prosecutors, and public defenders alikeinto cogs in an out-of-control case-processing
machine.”); Spinak, supra note 113, at 1620 (regarding the “current trend in drug court
procedure of requiring a guilty plea or waiver of other due process rights as a condition of
entering treatment, rather than permitting the defendant to begin treatment without entering
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encourages a probing examination of the underlying arrest and the
Instead, problem-solving courts focus on
accused’s culpability. 115
treatment, usually part of sentencing discussions. At best, you end up with
a system of misplaced, though perhaps well-intentioned, social service
programs grafted onto people, many of whom probably really did not need
to be in the Criminal Court in the first place.116
Whose problems do these courts purport to solve? The courts’? The
prosecution’s? Law enforcement’s? Society’s? The defendants’? And,
what is the problem they purport to solve? Recidivism? Public safety?
Public perceptions about the courts and justice? Public perceptions about,
and fear of, crime? Court efficiency in the face of huge caseloads?
Alcohol and drug abuse? These are obvious and vital questions for any
discussion about problem-solving courts. 117 If the courts are concerned
primarily with the defendant and his “problems,” then we must ask what
sort of therapeutic value is added by the problem-solving court. Well
before terms like problem-solving courts and therapeutic jurisprudence
came into the vernacular, scholars found that defendants cared about more
than the outcomes of their cases. To the surprise of some, it turned out that
defendants also cared deeply about the process and whether they were
treated fairly. 118 In fact, many suggested that treating defendants fairly
increased the chances that they would avoid future misconduct.119
a plea”). But see John Feinblatt et al., The Future of Problem-Solving Courts, 15 CT.
MANAGER 28, 33 (2000) (suggesting that some problem-solving courts have procedures that
“improve upon the current climate of coercion”).
115. John Feinblatt & Derek Denckla, What Does it Mean to be a Good Lawyer?
Prosecutors, Defenders and Problem-Solving Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 206, 209 (Jan./Feb.
2001) (“In problem-solving courts, the criminal justice system is consciously shifting
resources out of the process of adjudicating legal guilt and innocence and into treatment
services because we don’t want to spend so much time playing adversarial games if
defendants are going to end up pleading guilty anyway.”).
116. See Nolan, supra note 82, at 1541 (supporters of problem-solving courts “argue that
the need for legal change is heightened by the failure of traditional institutions to handle a
growing number of social problems”).
117. One commentator suggests that problem-solving courts seek to address “the
underlying problems of individual litigants, the structural problems of the justice system,
and the social problems of the communities.” Greg Berman, What is a Traditional Judge
Anyway? Problem Solving in the State Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 78, 78 (2000).
118. See, e.g., JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975); Jonathan D. Casper, Having Their Day in Court:
Defendant Evaluations of the Fairness of Their Treatment, 12 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 237
(1978); Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Perceived Injustice in Defendants’ Evaluations of Their
Courtroom Experience, 18 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 51 (1984).
119. See, e.g., Steven Zeidman, Sacrificial Lambs or the Chosen Few?: The Impact of
Student Defenders on the Rights of the Accused, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 853, 899 n.178 (1996);
Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME &
JUST. 283, 297 (2003) (stating that “procedural justice is a key antecedent of long-term
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The defendants’ feelings of unfairness did not have to do with whether
they were treated therapeutically or whether their problems were solved.
Rather, defendants clamored for what boils down to basic due process.
They wanted an advocate to fight for their rights, and for a judge to give
them their day in court. Defendants voiced particular concerns about their
lawyers. So-called consumer perspective studies consistently reflect
complaints that lawyers failed to provide advice or counsel.120 Instead,
countless defendants stated that their lawyers simply urged them,
vociferously, to plead guilty. 121 Defendants wanted, not surprisingly, an
advocate; a lawyer who would fight to enforce their rights. If we truly
cared about therapeutic value to the accused of court proceedings, we
would strive mightily to ensure that every defendant felt like he had his day
in court and that all his rights were protected. Those do not seem to be
high priority goals of the problem-solving courts. 122
While problem-solving may well be therapeutic for the community, and
even the accused, does it address concerns about innocence, racially
motivated arrests, and police falsifications?
Shouldn’t courts be
investigating more cases? Shouldn’t courts be holding more suppression
hearings and more trials? Instead, it seems that problem-solving courts,
with their emphasis on sentencing and treatment, further imbed a culture of
pleas and blind faith in police activity. By focusing on “helping” the
accused, and often “demanding” guilty pleas in the process, these courts
serve ironically to better insulate police falsifications from ever coming to
the surface.
The Mollen Commission’s second category of police falsification is

compliance”).
120. See, e.g., Zeidman, supra note 78, at 873 n.200.
121. See, e.g., JONATHAN D. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICETHE DEFENDANT’S
PERSPECTIVE 106 (1972) (“Most of the men reported that among the first words uttered by
their public defender were: ‘I can get you [X] if you plead guilty.’”); Alan F. Arcuri,
Lawyers, Judges, and Plea Bargaining: Some New Data on Inmates’ Views, 4 INT’L J.
CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY 177, 183 (1976) (defendants “reported that they were pressured
into pleading guilty”); Glen Wilkerson, Public Defenders as Their Clients See Them, 1 AM.
J. CRIM. L. 141, 143 (1972) (“[R]eal or imagined pressure to plead guilty is a frequent
complaint of defender clients.”).
122. See, e.g., Richard Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treatment Court
Movement, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1205, 1255 (1998) (defendants who agree to participate in
treatment court “effectively forego the presumption of innocence and the panoply of trial
rights guaranteed by the Constitution”); Nolan, supra note 82, at 1559.
In fact, drug court clients typically sign forms waiving a host of constitutional
rights in order to participate in a drug court, including the right to trial by jury, the
right to a speedy trial, the right to a preliminary hearing, and the requirement of
probable cause for a search and seizure.
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called “documentary perjury”where an officer swears falsely under oath
in an affidavit or criminal complaint. 123 Once again, police engage in this
form of corruption because they know they can, and do, get away with it.
In 2004, more than 190,000 people were arrested on misdemeanor charges
in New York City. 124 For sure, the overwhelming majority were people of
color. 125 Factor in growing concerns about innocence and the ever present
specter of police corruption and it becomes clear that judges must
meaningfully review the pleadings as early as possible.
In People v. Dumas, 126 the Court of Appeals of New York stressed that a
misdemeanor complaint must allege “facts of an evidentiary character”127
demonstrating “reasonable cause” to believe the accused committed the
crime charged. 128 The complaints at issue contained merely conclusory
statements and were dismissed as facially insufficient. The court
emphasized the critical nature of the reasonable cause determination by
pointing out that a misdemeanor complaint can serve as the basis for an
arrest warrant, and is designed to provide the court with sufficient facts to
decide whether the accused should be held for further proceedings.129
Given the consequences that can flow from a misdemeanor complaint, it is
entirely appropriate that it be comprised of evidentiary facts instead of
conclusory statements.
Just one year later, the court applied the logic of Dumas to
“informations.” 130 The court held that an information must demonstrate
both “reasonable cause” and a legally sufficient or prima facie case.131 As
revealed by Judge Bellacosa in his concurring opinion, the court was well
aware of the impact of its holding and the “practicalities encountered in
prosecuting the relatively greater numbers of these relatively less serious
crimes,” 132 but the need for specific factual allegations was seen as
necessary “so that such prosecutions do not become routinized or treated by
anyone as insignificant or unimportant.”133 Amazingly, the call for

123. Mollen Report, supra note 29, at 36.
124. CITE – I RECEIVED THIS NUMBER VIA EMAIL TO AUTHOR FROM NYS DIVISION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES (DCJS)
125. See, e.g., CJA Research Brief, supra note 6, at 4 (eighty-four percent of those
arrested for non-felonies in 1998 were African-American or Latino).
126. 497 N.E.2d 686 (N.Y. 1986).
127. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.15(3) (McKinney 2005).
128. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.40(4)(b).
129. Dumas, 497 N.E.2d at 687.
130. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.15.
131. People v. Alejandro, 511 N.E.2d 71, 73 (N.Y. 1987).
132. Id. at 75.
133. Id.
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accusatory instruments with evidentiary facts has simply spawned a slew of
accusatory instruments containing remarkably similar, canned language.
This is evidenced by complaints charging misdemeanor drug possession in
New York City courts, 134 often with similar concluding paragraphs
extolling the officer’s experience and training regarding narcotics,
regardless of whether it is the officer’s first or one-hundredth drug case.
Judges must avoid lapsing into perfunctory review of sufficiency and
reasonable cause, and their critical scrutiny of the accusatory instrument
should take place at the arraignment. 135
Falsifying records, primarily police reports, is the third category of
police falsification.136 The judiciary can best police this form of corruption
by monitoring discovery practice.137 The criminal discovery procedure
embodied in Article 240 was enacted almost twenty-five years ago, and
was intended to promote the greater, freer, and earlier exchange of
information between the parties. 138 As the court stated in People v.
Copicotto, 139 the discovery statute
evinces a legislative determination that the trial of a criminal charge

134. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.03 (McKinney 2003).
135. While many judges decline to hear oral sufficiency challenges at arraignments, it
seems apparent that, not only should they entertain such motions, they are in fact obligated
to do so. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.45; People v. Hernandez, 770 N.E.2d 566, 566
(N.Y. 2002); People v. Machado, 698 N.Y.S.2d 416, 419 (Crim. Ct. 1999). The
Constitution mandates that a reasonable cause determination be made by a judge “promptly”
after a defendant has been arrested without a warrant. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125
(1975); see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.20 (persons arrested must be arraigned
without unnecessary delay); County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 55-57 (1991)
(a probable cause determination coupled with arraignment must generally take place within
forty-eight hours of arrest); People ex rel. Maxian v. Brown, 568 N.Y.S.2d 575, 577 (App.
Div. 1990), aff’d, 77 N.Y.2d 422 (1991) (a delay of more than twenty-four hours between
arrest and arraignment is presumptively unreasonable).
136. Mollen Report, supra note 29, at 36.
137. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.20. Since there is no constitutional right to pretrial
discovery, Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987), public policy considerations figure
prominently. New York also statutorily prescribes a practice for bills of particular. N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 200.95. According to the practice commentaries,
[t]he function of a bill of particulars is to “define more specifically the crime or
crimes charged . . . or, in other words, to provide clarification” by furnishing
information as to the substance of the factual allegations. Thus its office is to give
the defendant information regarding the circumstances underlying the accusation,
or its context, so that the defendant understands precisely what it is he or she is to
defend against.
Peter Preiser, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 200.95, Practice Commentaries.
138. See, e.g., James A. Yates, Discovery Provision is Misunderstood, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 14,
2003, at 2 (“As one of the principals involved in the drafting of Article 240, I feel compelled
to point out that Article 240 was intended to advance, not restrict, discovery.”).
139. 406 N.E.2d 465, 468 (N.Y. 1980).
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should not be a sporting event where each side remains ignorant of facts
in the hands of the adversary until events unfold at trial. Broader pretrial
discovery enables the defendant to make a more informed plea decision,
minimizes the tactical and often unfair advantage to one side, and
increases to some degree the opportunity for an accurate determination of
guilt or innocence. 140

Discovery has evolved into a series of form filings, responses, and
decisions. Judges should invest in discovery so that it meets its lofty ideals
as to what must be turned over, 141 when it must be turned over,142 and
sanctions against the prosecutor for failing to turn it over.143
The judiciary has at its disposal several other mechanisms to help detect
falsifications in police reports. In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court
held that a criminal defendant has a due process right to disclosure of
evidence favorable to him and material to guilt or punishment. 144 New
York courts have often found greater protection for defendants on Bradyrelated claims than that granted by the federal courts. 145 Subpoenas
provide another avenue for prying loose police reports that might contain
lies. 146 While there is no constitutional right to subpoena government
documents, 147 trial judges do indeed have the discretionary authority to
issue subpoenas duces tecum. 148 New York’s Freedom of Information Law
(“FOIL”) was enacted to provide the public with access to government

140. Id.
141. See, e.g., Yates, supra note 138 (discussing the court’s discretionary authority to
order discovery).
142. See, e.g., Levenson, supra note 63, at 792 (“[J]udges often allow prosecutors to skirt
their responsibility to turn over timely discovery . . . .”).
143. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.40. See BRAD MIDDLEKAUFF, CRIMINAL DISCOVERY IN
NEW YORK STATE: A REPORT TO THE NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY CODES COMMITTEE 58
(1992) (discussing, inter alia, the use of sanctions for discovery violations). Inadequate
pretrial discovery has many other adverse consequences. See e.g., Jenny Roberts, Too
Little, Too Late: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the Duty to Investigate, and Pretrial
Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097 (2004) (discussing how
insufficient discovery, and the corresponding inability to fully investigate, leads to
ineffective assistance of counsel).
144. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); see Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1972).
145. See Abraham Abramovsky, Pretrial ‘Brady’ Disclosure in N.Y., N.Y.L.J., Nov. 30,
2001, at 3 (regarding New York courts finding greater rights for defendants with respect to
the timing and scope of Brady disclosures); see also People v. Vilardi, 555 N.E.2d 915, 919
(N.Y. 1990); People v. Novoa, 517 N.E.2d 219, 223 (N.Y. 1987).
146. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW art. 610.
147. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 56 (1987).
148. See, e.g., People v. Bagley, 720 N.Y.S.2d 454, 455 (App. Div. 2001) (finding that
the defendant must provide a factual predicate that the documents sought would bear
relevant and exculpatory evidence); Yates, supra note 138.

ZIEDMANCHRISTENSEN

2005]

2/3/2011 10:01 PM

POLICING THE POLICE

127

records. 149 While the applicability of FOIL to pending criminal cases has
generated much debate and litigation, the time is ripe for judges to
reconsider FOIL requests as appropriate in particular cases.150
The usual objection to expanded discovery devices is administrative.
The police department, in particular, objects that it cannot function under
the weight of too many subpoenas and FOIL requests. 151 Should the courts
be more concerned with police department complaints about a plethora of
paperwork, or with making sure that every litigated case is free from
corruption? Again, the Mollen Commission and the history of police
scandals speak directly to that question. How better to track down
falsifications in police reports than by making them available to the defense
and the subject of thorough and probing cross-examination?
The prosecutor’s special role is supposedly to seek justice, not merely
convictions. 152 Where was, and is, the prosecutor in this tale of rampant
police falsification? How do prosecutors identify police perjury? What do
they do when a police officer is found to be incredible? The fact is, a
subsequent prosecution for perjury is altogether rare. 153 The anecdotal
evidence suggests that prosecutors often ignore manifestations of police
corruption. 154 In the course of ascribing blame and fault for flourishing
police falsifications, the Mollen Commission added,
Officers and their immediate supervisors are not the only culprits in
tolerating falsifications . . . the Department’s top commanders must share

149. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 84 et seq. (McKinney 1988). For illustrative purposes see
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
150. See, e.g., Legal Aid Soc’y v. N.Y. City Police Dep’t, 713 N.Y.S.2d 3, 4 (App. Div.
2000); Gould v. N.Y. City Police Dep’t, 675 N.E.2d 808, 812 (N.Y. 1996) (finding that the
police department’s “complaint follow-up report” was not entitled to blanket protection
under one of FOIL’s enumerated exemptions).
151. See Jeremy Travis & Thomas P. Doepfner, Using Subpoenas to Obtain Police
Records, N.Y.L.J., May 21, 1993, at 1 (discussing the costs to the police department of
judicial subpoenas duces tecum).
152. See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, Mental Culpability and Prosecutorial Misconduct,
26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 121, 129 n.17 (1998); Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek
Justice,” 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 643 (1999).
153. See, e.g., Cloud, supra note 40, at 1313 (“Occasionally police officers are
prosecuted for perjury, and from time to time they are punished. These cases are unusual,
however, and undoubtedly represent only a fraction of the cases in which perjury has
occurred.”); Irving Younger, The Perjury Routine, NATION, May 8, 1967, at 596 (“The
policeman is as likely to be indicted for perjury by his co-worker, the prosecutor, as he is to
be struck down by thunderbolts from an avenging heaven.”).
154. The Mollen Commission reported about a practice referred to as “collars-fordollars.” Mollen Report, supra note 29, at 39. This scheme involved officers making
unlawful arrests timed conveniently to generate overtime pay for the arresting officer. Id.
According to the Commission, this practice was “widely known to officers, police
supervisors, and prosecutors alike.” Id.
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the blame. Members of the law enforcement community, and particularly
defense attorneys, told us that this same tolerance is sometimes exhibited
among prosecutors. Indeed, several former and current prosecutors
acknowledged“off the record”that perjury and falsifications are
serious problems in law enforcement that, though not condoned, are
ignored. 155

How did the District Attorneys respond to the knowledge that they were
apparently regularly played like fools, or worse, exposed? When the nature
and extent of police falsifications began to surface, the District Attorney of
Brooklyn called the problem “significant,” and his counterpart in Queens
termed it “terribly troublesome.” 156 What sort of post-hoc grand rounds
did they engage in to see how they missed all the testilying, reportilying,
and related falsifications? What do they now do differently as a result? 157
How have they incorporated the lessons of the Mollen Commission into
their training about police credibility and the need for prosecutors to
critically, and even skeptically, evaluate police officers’ accounts of
arrests?
These are critical questions. The prosecutor, after all, serves as the
frontline or the gatekeeper to the criminal court. It is the prosecutor who
interviews the arresting officer and decides whether to initiate criminal
proceedings. 158 The prosecutor’s decision to file a criminal court
accusatory instrument represents some form of vouching for the arresting
officer. Their ability, and willingness,159 to carefully and accurately
discern truth and ferret out lies is of paramount concern. 160 Yet,
administrative changes over the years have served to distance prosecutors
from arresting officers, thereby making it that much harder to assess
credibility. It was once standard practice for the arresting officer to be
interviewed by a prosecutor in-person shortly after the arrest. Today, more
and more, the interview is conducted over the phone or through
videoconferencing. 161 As a result, the possibility of being trained to look
155. Id. at 41-42.
156. Sexton, supra note 71.
157. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Role of Prosecutors in Dealing with Police
Abuse: The Lessons of Los Angeles, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 305, 308 (2001) (discussing
what the prosecutors could have done to better prevent the police scandal in Los Angeles,
and what they should do in the future to prevent such abuses).
158. Id. at 305 (“Prosecutors are thus in a unique role to oversee and monitor the conduct
of the police.”).
159. Id. at 310 (addressing the reluctance of some prosecutors to challenge police
officers’ accounts of the arrest).
160. Id. at 316 (arguing that prosecutors have a responsibility to “question and evaluate”
police officers’ credibility, especially since so many cases are resolved without a trial).
161. See, e.g., Bill Farrell, A New Arrest Process, DAILY NEWS, Dec. 7, 1995, at 2;
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for so-called telltale signs of lying (i.e., shifting in the seat; averting one’s
eyes; etc.) is rendered meaningless.162
Other actions by prosecutors have the effect of making it harder, rather
than easier, to detect police falsification. The New York State District
Attorney’s Association, in conjunction with the New York State Law
Enforcement Council (“LEC”), has labored mightily to restrict the flow of
information to the defense. As discussed above, New York’s Freedom of
Information Law provides public access to government records.163 The
LEC has supported legislation that exempts law enforcement agency
records relating to pending criminal cases from FOIL. 164 If passed, this
legislation would close a potential path to the discovery of police
falsification. In People v. Ranghelle, the Court of Appeals held that
reversal was the appropriate remedy whenever the prosecution failed to
disclose any prior statements of a witness who testified at trial. 165 The
LEC steadfastly and aggressively advocated for the legislation that
overruled Ranghelle by removing the automatic reversal remedy and
substituting a harmless error analysis.166
Joseph P. Fried, TV Speeds Cases From Police to Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1995, at
B4 (“[v]ideo teleconferencing is about efficiency, processing arrests and returning police
officers to the street as quickly as possible,” quoting then Police Commissioner William J.
Bratton); Bob Kappstatter, BLAP! Bronx Cops Fight Time, DAILY NEWS, July 21, 1995, at 2;
Leonard Rubin, PC-Based Video Provides More Bang for the Buck, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 23, 1995,
at S2; Chuck Sudetic, Plan Streamlines Booking in 14 Brooklyn Precincts, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 14, 1995, at B2 (“[w]e all used to think you had to see a police officer and a victim
sitting across a table,” quoting an assistant district attorney).
162. This is but another example of the ways the Criminal Court emphasizes efficiency at
the expense of truthseeking. Not that long ago, the arresting officer had to speak with a
prosecutor face-to-face, and also had to appear in court at the arraignment. See, e.g., E.R.
Shipp, Prearraignment System to be Used by Morgenthau, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1982, at 32.
In both situations, the officer was subject to being questioned about the circumstances
surrounding the arrest. Id. As we move closer to a form of virtual justice, the arresting
officer becomes increasingly insulated from any meaningful questioning about his or her
behavior. In similar fashion, “[m]ost assistant district attorneys do not appear in court to
‘cover’ their cases; rather the day’s docket is handled by ADAs assigned to a courtroom part
who rely on written instructions provided by the ADA assigned to each respective part.”
Rayner, supra note 1, at 1063 n.81. This practice of prosecution by note often deprives the
court and defense counsel of vital information during case conferences, and also distances
the prosecutor from the accused; it is not uncommon for a prosecutor to never actually see
the person she is prosecuting.
163. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
164. N.Y. State Law Enforcement Council, 1998 Legislative Priorities 37 (1998).
165. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 240.44, 240.45 (McKinney 2005); 503 N.E.2d 1011
(N.Y. 1986); see Mark M. Baker, The ‘Rosario’ Per Se Rule: Rest in Peace, N.Y.L.J., Mar.
14, 2001, at 1 (automatic reversal was the remedy if the prosecutor failed to disclose prior
statements, memoranda, or other materials in their possession relating to the subject matter
of the witness’s testimony).
166. See, e.g., Charles J. Hynes, Open Discovery Law Seen as Separate Issue, N.Y.L.J.,
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Putting aside the question of whether the Ranghelle rule did in fact result
in many reversals, it is important to examine the impact of the rule. Given
the fear of an automatic reversal, one would imagine that prosecutors were
more diligent than ever before to track down and disclose every document
connected to the case. What better way to uncover the existence of
falsified reports? The prosecutors took a similar tack with respect to
subpoenas, and joined with the police department in a concerted effort to
reduce the numbers of judicial subpoenas duces tecum. 167 As a result of
these policies, police reports remain buried, far away from the light of day.
Prosecutors must also reconsider the role of the guilty plea. Policies or
practices that effectively punish defendants for litigating suppression
issues, and/or culpability, result in overwhelming numbers of guilty
pleas. 168 These pleas, in turn, result in unchecked, unmonitored police
activity. As part of their justice-seeking function, prosecutors should
endeavor to expose police actions to scrutiny from judges and juries.
One commentator argues that the ethical lens has been pointed at the
defense bar for too long, and he advocates turning it in the direction of the
prosecution. 169 Others suggest, similarly, that it is appropriate to demand
greater ethical conduct from prosecutors. 170 As one leading authority
stated, as “a minister of justice to protect innocent persons from wrongful
convictions,” the prosecutor has “a duty to make an independent evaluation
of the credibility of his witnesses, the reliability of forensic evidence, and
the truth of the defendant’s guilt” beyond that mandated by the ethical
rules. 171 To date, prosecutors have been relatively free from oversight or
critical review. 172 There are very few cases where disciplinary authorities
have sanctioned prosecutors.173 It is also rare for appellate courts to
Apr. 16, 1996, at 2 (“For the past eight years the District Attorneys’ Association has sought
legislation to overrule the decision[s] in People v. Ranghelle . . . failure to turn over any
prior written or recorded statement of a witness at trial is per se reversible error.”). In 2000,
the legislature eliminated the so-called Ranghelle rule. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.75
(effective 2/1/01).
167. See Travis & Doepfner, supra note 151 (“Over the past few years, the [police]
department has pursued an aggressive litigation program, in cooperation with the District
Attorney’s offices, in an attempt to reduce the number of inappropriately issued
subpoenas.”).
168. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. Judges also use the threat of a higher
sentence to disincline defendants from litigating their cases. Id.
169. Dershowitz, supra note 40.
170. Green, supra note 69.
171. Gershman, supra note 69, at 337.
172. Gary C. Williams, The Rampart Scandal: Policing the Criminal Justice System;
Incubating Monsters?: Prosecutorial Responsibility for the Rampart Scandal, 34 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 829, 837 n.44 (2001).
173. See Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 454
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reverse convictions based on prosecutorial misconduct.174 Apparently,
prosecutors are also rarely disciplined within their own offices, even when
an appellate court has found that they withheld exculpatory evidence.175
It seems to be the case that prosecutors, as well as judges, are not simply
oblivious to police falsifications. Rather, they are also too willing to turn a
blind eye in that direction. As one commentator asked rhetorically, “Is it
possible that hundreds of thousands of transparent cases of police perjury
are occurring every year in the courts of this country without prosecutors
and judges knowing about it, and even encouraging it? I don’t think so.” 176
If indeed those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it,177
then the Criminal Court must address the recurring, systemic problem of
police falsification quickly. After all, we are already ten years into the next
cycle.

(1992); Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721,
722 (2001).
174. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial
Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 862 (1995)
(“The prosecutor’s [exercise of discretion] is effectively unreviewable by courts.”).
175. See, e.g., Andrea Elliott, Prosecutors Not Penalized, Lawyer Says, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
17, 2003, at B1; Andrea Elliott & Benjamin Weiser, When Prosecutors Err, Others Pay the
Price; Disciplinary Action is Rare After Misconduct or Mistakes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21,
2004, at 25.
176. Dershowitz, supra note 40, at 17; see Slobogin, supra note 39, at 1046 (referring to
a study finding “stunning evidence of prosecutorial and judicial nonchalance”); Chase,
supra note 40, at 775 (stating need to “encourage prosecutors and judges to be more critical
in their evaluation of police officer accounts of their criminal investigations”).
177. GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON: INTRODUCTION AND REASON IN COMMON
SENSE 284 (Charles Scribner’s Sons 2d ed. 1936) (1905) (“Those who cannot remember the
past are condemned to repeat it.”).

